Necessity of Overhauling the Organisation

Although elsewhere he mentioned that the 1919 Railway Strike and the 1920 Mining Strike were or could be interpreted as signs, that the Labour movement was gathering strength and momentum for an attack by some form of mass action, in a Memorandum of February 1921 to the members of the Sub-committee Williams pointed out, that the non—success of the Alliance was most evident in these two instances. That memorandum was an attempt to overhaul the constitution of the Alliance. The response, however, was less than luke-warm; there was no response at all from the miners.

In April 1920, the NUR had already requested the examination of existing machinery and the necessary organization required to prepare the unions for the future. The Sub-committee resolved then, that it would meet on the first Wednesday of each month to supply information and to indicate a policy to the three Executive Committees, which would meet regularly to consider the promotion of efficiency and policy of the constituent bodies. A more substantive agreement did not result from this.

The system of consulting the rank and file was not only unchanged, neither was the rank and file involvement made to become more meaningful. It is, therefore, remarkable to read in the Railway Review in a reconsideration of Black Friday:
One of the factors responsible for the plans of the Triple Alliance going awry in the last hour was the unwillingness of the rank and file to follow the lead given by Messrs. Thomas, Gosling, and Co. The chief element ensuring success was lacking - there was an astounding lack of appreciation in the rank and file of the fundamental principles at stake.

A more realistic 'Foreman’ blamed in the same issue of the Railway Review the union leaders for the sudden and dramatic bursting of the Alliance. It was not by such slipshod haphazard methods of forming alliances - he pointed out - that would ever bear fruition in the trade union movement. Alliances must not be of the bogey principle - he added - but 'must be planted with good seed and firmly put into the ground’.

The strength of the Triple Alliance was impaired by the unequal measures of power, that its three constituent bodies possessed. The power which had been vested in the Executive Committee of the NUR and the MFGB by their respective organisations was far greater than that of the Executive Committee of the NTWF. Bevin especially made some efforts to increase the cohesion between the 36 trade unions affiliated to the NTWF - with scant success, however. This weakness clearly revealed itself when the attempt was made to bring the machinery of the Alliance into action.

In the early days of the Triple Alliance, in January 1914, the Dock, Wharf, Riverside, and General Workers’ Union suggested to the NUR an amalgamation of their union with the NUR. The NUR preferred the co-operation within the Alliance, and it, therefore, rejected a fusion of all transport workers into one union, later in 1914. It did make, however, an agreement with the Dockers about demarcation problems.

The bodies connected with the Alliance took the view, that the basis of representation to the alliance must be industrial, and that the right course of action for outside sections which desired admission was that of amalgamation with the appropriate constituent body of the Alliance itself. From the point of view of the allied bodies this was quite understandable, but somewhat naive as well, for the craft unions that were active in the mining and railway industries did not amalgamate with the industrial unions, because they did not accept the principle of industrial organisation. These craft unions - as for instance the ASLEF and certain unions of colliery engine men - made an effort to secure admission to the Alliance, because they felt that they would be involved in any industrial action of the Alliance. But they only wanted to be admitted as a separate body. This was not acceptable for the allied unions, and, therefore, they were refused admission. When the Alliance was close to action, it had, however, to consult these unions to secure their co~operation. So their exclusion did not contribute to the effectiveness of the Alliance.

The Triple Alliance was as strong as the constituent members wanted it to be. Within it the unions claimed their full autonomy. They did not want to delegate any of their responsibilities, and they did not want the interference of the Alliance - of their 'partners’ - in their internal affairs. They sat in different rooms as three different organizations taking their own decisions, and yet when they came together in full conclave they were supposed to transform themselves at a moment's notice into a completely co-ordinated fighting machine. It is clear, that wanted was impossible. The rank and file had to be informed, and to be consulted; the craft unions in the respective industries had to be informed, and to be consulted, and that all had to be done by an organisation that had no officers, no offices, no funds, not even any notepaper. Additionally it had - more important – no plan of campaign. It acted only, when one of the constituent bodies wanted it to act; and in such a situation it had to improvise hurriedly.

During the 1920 Mining Dispute, Smillie stated, that it was his idea, that the Alliance ought to be a machine that could work at once. That could, within 24 hours if necessary, or within two or three days, take action. But its constitution - he added – had been so safeguarded that it had not been possible to make it the really effective machine it ought to be. At that moment he must have forgotten that it was his MFGB in particular that was to criticise for this, for they had been committed to the ballot process, which made immediate action impossible. They also conducted always their own negotiations with government and employers, and they therefore placed their partners - when these ended in a dead-lock - for a 'fait accompli’.

It is not known, how much Lloyd George knew of these weaknesses in the Triple Alliance. It is clear, however, that in March/April 1921 he was confident that the Alliance would once again fail to operate. He kept in close touch with J.H. Thomas and E. Bevin, and had no difficulty in ascertaining that they were both extremely reluctant to bring their men out in support of the miners. He said:
I think we had better have the strike. Let them kick their heels for a week or a fortnight. It will help the moderates against the extremists. What I most wish is that I had some conference abroad to go to urgently and then I could come back in a fortnight and take up the negotiations again.

Lloyd George did not go abroad. Instead he skillfully split the Triple Alliance by offering the miners a resumption of negotiations at the eleventh hour. Again, however, the miners showed more intransigence than bargaining skill. The opportunity of doing a special piece of practical work was thrust upon the Alliance. The circumstances were most difficult, but - Gosling pointed out - they could have been successfully handled if the proper machinery had been in existence. The Triple Alliance was not that machinery.